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GLOBE

&

RUTGERS INS. CO.

[L. A. No. 24521.

v.

AIRBORNE FLOWER

In Bank.

[49

C.2d

Aug. 30, 1957.]

GLOBE AND RU'fGEHS FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
(a Corporation), Respondent, v. AIRBORNE FLOWER
AND FREIGHT TRAFFIC, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Carriers-Properly-Connecting Carriers-Rates and Tariifs:

Liability of Initial Carrier.-In order for an air freight forwarder to bring itself within the terms of an intrastate tariff,
incorporated in an airbill by reference, providing that such
tariff shall inure to the benefit of any person performing delivery or ground service in connection with an air freight
shipment, the forwarder must show that it performed the
delivery service for an air carrier, and in the absence of a
stipulation to the contrary such carrier's liability to the shipper
ceases on delivery of the shipment to the forwarder. (Civ.
Code, § 2201.)
[2] Id.-Property-Conneeting Carriers-Relation to Initial Carrier.-A finding that an air freight forwarder receiving an
intrastate air shipment from one city to another at the latter's
airport handled such shipment" as a carrier for hire on its
own account as an independent contractor, not as agent of the
initial carrier, was sustained by evidence that it was employed
to obtain a result, .namely, delivery of the shipment to the
consignee's store, that no control was retained or exercised
over the means by which it performed its task, that it was
free to choose the route, driver, type of vehicle and manner of
delivery, and that it used its own driver and equipment in
making the delivery.
[3] Id.-Properly-Connecting Carriers-Relation to Shipper.-An
instruction "PIs. A.M. delivery" indorsed on an airbill by the
shipper is insufficient to make an air freight forwarder the
shipper's agent.
[4] Id.-Properly-Delivery-Obligation of Carrier to Deliver.A finding that a contract of carriage between a shipper and
an air carrier did not require the carrier to deliver an intrastate air shipment to its destination in the city to which the
shipment was flown was sustained by evidence that the carrier's tariff did not provide for delivery by it of goods carried
on intrastate flights, that the shipment was accepted by the
carrier subject to such tariff, that the airbill showed a charge
by the carner for air transportation only, no charge being

[1J See Cal.Jur.2d, Carriers, § 121 et seq. j Am.Jur., Carriers,
§ 862 et seq.
Melt. Dig. References: [1-3, 5 J Carriers, § 51 j [4] Carriers, § 46.

Aug. 1957] GLOBE & RUTGERS

INS.

CO. v. AIRBORNE FLOWER 39

(49 C.2d 38; 314 P.2d 1411

made for ground delivery, that on arrival of the shipment at
the airport of the city to which the goods were flown an air
freight forwarder received the shipment, weighed it and determined the applicable rate for its transportation to its
destination within the city, and that the shipper paid the
carrier for transportation of the goods to the airport and paid
the forwarder a separate charge for its services.
[5] Id.-Property-Connecting Carriers-Limitation of Liability.
-Where an intrastate air shipment of cartons of furs from
one city to another was received by an air freight forwarder
at the airport of the city to which the goods were flown, which
forwarder gave the air carrier a receipt for the goods, and
where, some time after receipt of such goods by the forwarder
but before delivery to the consignee's store one carton containing furs worth $11,755 was lost by or stolen from the forwarder, its liability was not limited to the declared value of
the goods as $50 on the air bill, since the forwarder's freight
charges were computed by reference to weight alone and the
undervaluation of the furs as declared by the shipper could
not have affected that rate.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Burnett Wolfson, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for loss of a carton of furs. Judgment
for plaintllr affirmed.
Wallace, Garrison, Norton & Ray and Maynard Garrison
for Appellant.
Joseph F. Rank and Russell K. Lambeau for Respondent.
SHENK, J .-This is an appeal from a judgment for the
plaintiff for damages in the sum of $11,755 for the loss of
a carton of furs. The sole question is whether the judgment
should be reduced to $50 as specified in an airbill contract
of cartage.
United Air Lines is an air carrier engaged in the transportation for hire of passengers and freight in interstate and
intrastate commerce. Its contract cartage agent makes ground
delivery of freight carried on interstate flights. It has no
tariff on file with the California Public Utilities Commission
governing ground delivery of freight carried on its intrastate flights. Delivery of goods carried on those flights is accomplished by trucking concerns independent of United.
The defendant, Airborne Flower and Freight Traffic. is an
air freight forwarder. As an adjunct to its forwarding
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business it performs trucking services for air carriers which
operate from the San Francisco Air Terminal.
In June 1953 Saks Fifth Avenue delivered 10 cartons of
furs to United Air Lines at the Los Angeles airport for shipment by United to the San Francisco airport. The goods were
consigned to Saks' San Francisco Store. Saks declared the
value of the goods to be $50 and an airbill was issued so stating. The airbill recited that the shipment consisted of ten cartons of furs weighing 269 pounds, designated Saks' San Francisco store as the consignee and requested morning delivery.
No delivery charges were stated on the airbiU. Under the applicable tariff, Saks' declaration limited United's liability for
loss or damage to $50. The actual value of the shipment was
greatly in excess of its declared value, but it was undervalued
for the apparent purpose of securing a lower rate from United
whose charges are based in part upon the declared value of
the shipment.
When .the furs arrived at the San Francisco airport, they
were received by the defendant which gave United a receipt
for 10 cartons of furs. As stated by Airborne's claims agent
Airborne solicits trucking business from air carriers which
operate from the San Francisco airport and it also furnishes
delivery service to air carriers at their request. It cannot be
determined from the record which of these procedures was
followed in the procurement of the shipment here involved.
Some time after receipt by the defendant, but before delivery to Saks' San Francisco store, one carton containing
furs worth $11,755 was lost by or stolen from the defendant.
The plaintiff sues by right of subrogation under its policy
of insurance with Saks.
The facts are undisputed as is the defendant's liability.
The controversy relates to the amount of the liability. The
defendant contends that its liability is limited by Saks' declaration of value and United's tariff which, had the furs been lost
by United, would have limited United's liability to $50.
The plaintiff asserts that the defendant is liable for the actual
value of the furs.
The airbilI which was signed by Saks' agent at the Los
Angeles airport recites: "It is mutually agreed that the goods
herein described are accepted in apparent good order . . .
for transportation as specified herein, subject to governing
classifications and tariffs in effect as of the date hereof which
are filed in accordance with law. Said classifications and
tariffs, copies of which are available for inspection by the
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parties hereto, are hereby incorporated into and made a part
of this contract."
Rule 3.3 of the intrastate tariff filed by United Air Lines
with the California Public Utilities Commission provides:
"Except as provided in Rule 3.2 the carrier's liability shall
in no event exceed the declared value of the shipment. . . ."
Rule 3.l(b) of the same intrastate tariff provides: "The
Airbill, or other shipping document, and the tariffs applicable
to the shipment shall inure to the benefit of and be binding
upon the consignor and consignee and the carriers by whom
transportation is undertaken between the origin and destination, including destination on reconsignment or return of the
shipment; and shall inure also to the benefit of any other person, firm or corporation performing for the carrier pick-up,
delivery, or other ground service in connection with the shipment."
[1] To bring itself within the terms of the tariff, the defendant must show that it performed the delivery service for
United. United's route ended at the San Francisco terminal,
and upon its delivery of the shipment to Airborne, United's
liability to Saks was terminated. 1
[2] The trial court found that Airborne ". • . was not
handling said shipment as an agent of United Air Lines or
on behalf of United Air Lines in any other capacity, but . . .
was handling said shipment as a carrier for hire on its own
account as an independent contractor and carrier."
The record does not disclose how Airborne procured the
shipment from United. Airborne may have solicited the shipment or it may have been summoned by United and requested
by it to make the delivery. Although the evidence was not
developed on this point it is sufficient to support the finding
of the trial court that Airborne acted as an independent
contractor and not as an agent of United. It was employed
to obtain a result-the delivery of the shipment to Saks' San
Francisco store. No control was retained or exercised over
the means by which it performed that task. It was free to
choose the route, driver, type of vehicle and manner of delivery, and it used its own driver and equipment in making
the delivery. This case is to be distinguished from Twentieth
'California Civil Code, section 2201. "If a eo=on carrier accepts
f.reight for a place beyond his usual route, he must, unless he stipUlates
otherwise, deliver it at the end of his route in that direction to some
other competent carrier carrying to the place of address, or connected
with those who thus carry, and hie liability ceases upon making IIueh
delivery. "
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Oentury Delivery Service, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
00.,242 F.2d 292 relied upon by the defendant. In that case,
a subrogated insurer of a shipper sought to recover against a
connecting carrier the sum paid to the shipper for damage
by the connecting carrier to a coffee vending machine. The
shipment was carried subject to an airbill of lading which
incorporated the air carrier's tariffs. The applicable tariff
provided, as in the present case, that it should inure to the
benefit of any person performing delivery service for the air
carrier. The airbill execnted between the shipper and the
air carrier included charges for the delivery of the shipment
and the tariff was construed to include the defendant within
its coverage. It was held that the limitation of liability con·
tained in the tariff inured to the benefit of the connecting
carrier and the plaintiff's recovery was thus limited to the
declared value of the shipment.
The defendant contends that it acted as an agent of Saks
and as such is entitled to the limitation of liability. There
is no evidence relating to the arrangements between United
and Saks at the time of the shipment from the Los Angeles
airport or between United and the defendant at the San
Francisco airport. [3] The instructions "PIs. A. M. de·
livery" indorsed on the airbill was Saks' only instruction
relating to the delivery of the furs. It cannot be said that
that instruction alone was sufficient to make Airborne an
agent of Saks. The defendant contends, however, that the
contract between the shipper and United controls the rela·
tionship between the shipper and itself on the ground that
United was a "mere forwarder" of the goods to the defendant
who then became the "agent" of the shipper, performing the
delivery service subject to the terms of the airbill. (Of.
9 Am.Jur., Carriers, § 889.) The defendant relies upon
Oavallaro v. Texas &- Pac. Ry. 00., 110 Cal. 348 [42 P. 918,
52 Am.St.Rep. 94]. In that case, this court held a subse·
quent or connecting carrier liable to the shipper for mis·
delivery of goods. In so holding, it was stated that the theory
upon which the shipper's action was predicated was that the
connecting carrier was the agent of the shipper to forward'
or deliver the goods and was therefore liable to the shipper
for its default or misfeasance. An agency relatiom:hip be·
tween the shipper and the connecting carrier was used to ex·
plain the theory of the action and to distinguish a line of
English cases to the contrary. In Muschamp v. Lancaster
etc. Ry. 00., 8 Mees. & W. 421, it was held that a shipper
could recover against the first carrier for loss of goods by a
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subsequent carrier. As a corollary to the Muschamp case,
the English courts held that the shipper could not recover
against a connecting carrier because there was no "privity
of contract" between the shipper and the connecting carrier.
(Hutchinson on Carriers. 3d ed., §§ 228,229.) The Cavallaro
case states the theory upon which the "privity of contract"
limitation was abandoned, giving the shipper a cause of action
against the connecting carrier for loss of or damage to his
goods, but it does not require the incorporation into every
contract for the carriage of goods by a connecting carrier,
the provisions of the original bill of lading without consideration of all of its terms and the circumstances under
which the parties contracted.
The defendant contends that the airbill was a through bill
of lading and that Airborne was entitled to its benefits. It
relies upon a statement in 9 American Jurisprudence, Carriers,
section 388, which defines a through bill of lading as ". . .
one whereby the carrier agrees to transport the goods from
the point of delivery to a designated point of destination,
although such transportation extends over the line of a connecting carrier." If the airbill were a through bill it may
well be that its provisions including the limitation of liability would inure to Airborne.
[4] The trial court further found and concluded that the
contract of carriage between Saks and United did not require
United to deliver the shipment to its destination in San
Francisco. The evidence amply supports this conclusion.
United's tariff did not provide for delivery by it of goods
carried on intrastate flights. The shipment was accepted
by United subject to that tariff. The airbill shows a charge
by United for air transportation only. No charge was made by
United for ground delivery. Upon the arrival of the ship·
ment at the San Francisco airport Airborne received it,
weighed it, and determined the applicable rate for its transportation to San Francisco. Saks paid United for transportation of the furs to the San Francisco airport. Airborne
billed Saks directly and a separate charge for Airborne's services was paid by Saks to Airborne.
[5] It does not appear that the understatement by Saks
of the value of the furs had any legal relationship to the lia·
bility of Airborne. Its freight charges were computed by
reference to weight alone and the undervaluation of the furs
could not, therefore, have affected that rate.
The record supports the findings of the trial court and
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justifies the conclusion that there was no basis for the limitation of the defendant's liability to Saks or through Saks to
the plaintiff.
The judgment is affirmed.
Carter, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred.

)

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
The crucial document in this case is the airbilI delivered
by Saks' agent to United at the Los Angeles Airport. The
consignee of the goods was Saks' San Francisco store. The
airbill provided that, "Delivery will be made to the consignee at points where delivery service is available unless
otherwise specified below." Saks' agent did not specify otherwise. Instead, he circled the word "delivery," inserted the
street address of the San Francisco store, and under the
printed words "instructions to carrier," wrote "PIs. A. M.
Delivery. "
From this evidence it is obvious, and counsel for plaintiff
conceded in oral argument before this court, that Saks contemplated that the goods would be delivered to its San Francisco store, not left at the San Francisco Airport. Saks knew
that United had no surface delivery service, and could not
carry the goods to the San Francisco store itself. The only
reasonable conclusion is that Saks and United understood
that when the goods arrived at the San Francisco Airport,
United would obtain a carrier to take the goods to the store.
On behalf of Saks, and as authorized by Saks, United entered
into a contract with defendant for the delivery of the goods
to their contemplated destination.
What were the terms of that contract f The evidence shows
without conflict that the airbiIl placed in the hands of United
and passed on to the surface carrier was the only instruction
from Saks. It was the voice of Saks in the negotiations with
defendant. When defendant's agent accepted the goods, he
receipted the airbill and took a copy of it. Defendant reason··
ably concluded that the value declared in the airbilI was
the value Saks was willing to place on the goods throughout
their carriage to the San Francisco store. Saks should not
now be allowed to claim that it meant otherwise than its own
actions reasonably indicated.
I would modify the judgment by reducing it to $50 and
affirm it as so modified.
Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J., concurred.

